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S uppose that Developer owns an
office building subject to a record-
ed deed of trust and assignment of
rents in favor of State Bank. The build-
ing is partially occupied by Tenant A,
who is paying rent to Developer under
a long-term lease entered into several
years ago. Suppose further that two
months ago, because of Developer's
failure to pay income and payroll taxes,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed
a notice of tax lien against Developer
in the appropriate filing office. Finally,
suppose that just last week, Developer
entered into a new lease for the remain-
ing space in the building with Ten-
ant B. As between State Bank
and the IRS, which has pror-
ity for rents collected from 
Tenant A? From Tenant B?
Surprisingly, few re-
ported cases have ad-
dressed the relative
priority rights of a
mortgage lender
and the IRS for rents
from real estate. In
Bloomfield State Bank
v. United States, No.
10-3939, 2011 WL
1773953 (7th Cir.
May 11, 2011), Judge
Richard Posner pro-
vided the first reported
federal appellate opin-
ion; under its analysis,
State Bank would have pri-
ority over the IRS in the above
hypothetical for the rents due
from both tenants. This article dis-
cusses Judge Posner's opinion, both
for its result (which the author believes
is ultimately the correct result) and how
it characterizes background principles
of real estate finance law (as it turns out,
not entirely correctly). Before getting to
the opinion, however, this article begins
with a brief primer on federal tax liens.
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The Federal Tax Lien Act
The Federal Tax Lien Act (FTLA) grants
to the United States a lien on property
belonging to a taxpayer that fails to pay
federal taxes following proper demand.
26 U.S.C. § 6321. This lien relates back
to the date on which the taxes became
due, id. § 6322, and attaches to all exist-
ing and after-acquired real and per-
sonal property in which the taxpayer
has an interest. Id. § 6321; Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6321-1. Because the lien arises by
operation of law, it is a "secret lien" of
which third parties dealing with the
taxpayer may be unaware. Thus, the
FTLA requires the IRS to file a public
notice of the lien to make it effective
against the rights of subsequent pur-
chasers, judgment creditors, mechanics'
lienholders, and holders of consensual
security interests. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a).
The first-in-time principle provides
the baseline for determining the prior-
ity of conflicting property interests,
including federal tax liens. There are
circumstances, however, in which a
federal tax lien may take priority over
a conflicting first-in-time lien. One such
circumstance involves an unperfected
security interest. A security interest
arising under state law is deemed to
exist for FTLA purposes only if the col-
lateral is "in existence" and the interest
"has become protected under local law
against a subsequent judgment lien
arising out of an unsecured obligation."
26 U.S.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A). Thus, for
example, the holder of an unperfected
Article 9 security interest-whose claim
is subordinate to a judgment lien
creditor under UCC § 9-317(a)(2)
x (A)-would have no "securityinterest" within the mean-
ing of the FTLA, and thus
w ould be subordinate
to a later-filed federal
tax lien. By contrast,















within the meaning of the
ITA and would be subor-
dinate to a later-filed federal tax
lien. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank v.
United States, 932 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1991)
(applying Kentucky law). In many
states, however, even an unrecorded
mortgage is effective against judg-
ment creditors, and in those states an
unrecorded mortgage would still have
priority against a later-filed federal
tax lien. See, e.g., 11 Thompson on Real
Property § 92.09(b)(6) (2d Thomas ed.
2002) (noting the variation among state
recording statutes in protecting judg-
ment creditors).
The second circumstance involves
the headache-inducing "choateness"
doctrine. Even if a secured party has
properly perfected a security interest






before the government files notice of
its tax lien, the secured party will not
have priority over the tax lien unless
its security interest is "choate." As
explained in United States v. McDermott,
507 U.S. 447 (1993), a security interest
is choate if the identity of the secured
party, the property to which the interest
attaches, and the amount of the debt are
all "established." In a typical residential
mortgage transaction involving a single
mortgage loan and a security interest
in the borrower's home, choateness
is clear, and thus a properly recorded
mortgage lien will have priority over a
later-arising federal tax lien.
The choateness doctrine presents a
conceptual challenge when a secured
party attempts to enforce a lien against
after-acquired property or property
securing future advances. For example,
suppose that First Bank holds a prop-
erly perfected security interest in all of
the present and after-acquired accounts
receivable of Joe's Plumbing, against
which the IRS has just filed a tax lien
notice. Suppose further that over the
ensuing six months, Joe's Plumbing
performs a number of jobs for its cus-
tomers on account, under which Joe's
is entitled to be paid a total of $20,000.
UCC Article 9 certainly permits a debt-
or like Joe's Plumbing to grant a secu-
rity interest in after-acquired property.
UCC § 9-204(a). But the $20,000 worth
of accounts receivable at issue did not
legally exist until Joe's Plumbing did
the work and the customers became
liable for payment-which, in this sce-
nario, occurred only after the IRS filed
its tax lien notice. In tax-speak, these ac-
counts receivable were "inchoate" (that
is, not in existence) at the time the IRS
filed its tax lien notice. As a result, First
Bank's prior-perfected security interest
in these particular accounts would not
take priority over the tax lien, except
to the limited extent provided in FTLA
§ 6323(c) (which would apply only to
accounts that arose within 45 days after
the tax lien filing, and only to the extent
such accounts secured sums advanced
before the tax lien filing or within 45
days after that filing and without actual
notice or knowledge of the filing). See,
e.g., J.D. Court, Inc. v. United States, 712
E2d 258 (7th Cir. 1983).
Rents and the Federal Tax
Lien: Like Accounts, or Not?
Before its revision, Article 9 defined
"account" as a right to payment "for
goods sold or leased or for services
rendered." UCC § 9-106 (1972 text).
Revised Article 9, however, expanded
the definition of account to include "a
right to payment of a monetary obliga-
tion ... for property that has been or is
to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of." UCC § 9-102(a)
(2)(i) (emphasis added). By replacing
"goods" with "property," Article 9
expanded the definition of accounts to
include payment rights resulting from
contracts for the sale of intellectual
property and real estate. As a result,
the right to collect rents under a lease
of land technically constitutes an "ac-
count" within the meaning of Article 9.
This change in Article 9 did not have
any effect on documentation practices
for mortgage lending. Revised Article
9 still contains a scope limitation that
excludes from its coverage transactions
involving "the creation or transfer of
an interest in or lien on real property,
including a lease or rents thereunder."
UCC § 9-109(d)(11). Thus, a mortgagee
must create a lien on rents by taking
and recording an assignment of rents in
the real property records, either directly
in the mortgage itself or in a separate
document, rather than by using the
Article 9 mechanisms of attachment
and perfection.
As discussed in the previous section,
courts have generally held that under
the choateness doctrine, a federal tax
lien will have priority for accounts aris-
ing after the filing of a tax lien notice
(with limited exceptions). This creates a
potential concern for mortgage lend-
ers claiming a lien against rents arising
from the mortgaged land: how does
the choateness doctrine apply to such
rents? Because those rents are literally
"accounts," should the IRS have prior-
ity for rents collected after the IRS filed
its tax lien notice?
In some circumstances, the answer is
relatively clear. For example, return to
the hypothetical posed in the introduc-
tion. Developer's right to collect rents
accruing under Tenant A's lease came
"into existence" within the meaning of
the choateness doctrine on the signing
of the lease-before the IRS obtained its
tax lien-even if Developer cannot take
legal action to collect any specific rental
payment until it actually accrues. Be-
cause State Bank holds a prior recorded
assignment of rents, and the right to
collect rents under the lease came into
existence before the IRS filed its notice
of tax lien, State Bank has priority over
the IRS for those rents.
But what about the rents accruing
under Tenant B's lease? Tenant B's lease
did not come into existence until after
the IRS filed its tax lien notice. In this
situation, can the IRS successfully argue
that the choateness doctrine is not satis-
fied and that the IRS thus has priority
for rents arising under Tenant B's lease?
Until recently, this issue had gener-
ated only two lower court opinions,
neither printed in official reporters.
In First National Bank of Ohio v. United
States, No. 5:90CV1984, 1994 WL 481357
(N.D. Ohio, Mar. 28, 1994), the court
ruled for the IRS, analogizing the rents
arising after the tax lien filing to after-
acquired accounts. By contrast, in Bank
One, West Virginia, N.A. v. United States,
No. A.3:93-1053, 1996 WL 303276 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 29, 1996), the court ruled
in favor of the mortgagee, concluding
that the IRS wrongfully levied on rents
arising under a sublease entered into
after the IRS filed its tax lien notice.
Bloomfield State Bank v. United States
provides the first reported appellate
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opinion addressing the issue. Although
Bloomfield State Bank properly resolved
the dispute in favor of the mortgagee,
its language and reasoning in reaching
this conclusion bear close scrutiny.
The Bloomfield
State Bank Case
In 2004, Bloomfield State Bank (Bloom-
field) obtained and recorded a mort-
gage and assignment of rents on the
borrower's land. In 2007, the borrower
defaulted, and the IRS filed a notice
of tax lien against the land. At some
point, Bloomfield obtained the appoint-
ment of a receiver for the land pending
foreclosure, and the receiver success-
fully leased a portion of the mortgaged
premises, collecting a total of $82,675
in rents. When the IRS claimed that its
tax lien took priority over Bloomfield's
lien in these rents, Bloomfield filed an
action in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana seeking a
judgment declaring that Bloomfield's
lien on the rents had priority.
Citing First National Bank of Ohio, the
IRS argued that the rents had not come
into existence until after the IRS filed its
tax lien notice, entitling the IRS to prior-
ity. The district judge agreed, analogiz-
ing the rents to after-acquired accounts
receivable and thus concluding that the
result was controlled by the decision in
J.D. Court, 712 E2d 258:
[U.D. Court] held that "a security
interest in accounts receivable does
not become 'choate' until the ac-
counts receivable actually come into
existence ... at the time the services
giving rise to the accounts receiv-
able are performed." 712 E2d at 263.
The Court sees no reason why the
Seventh Circuit would have reached
a different result if the property
at issue in J.D. Court were rental
payments as opposed to accounts
receivable.
Bloomfield State Bank v. United States,
No. 2:10-cv-00131-LJM-WGH, 2010
WL 5640193 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 27,2010).
Bloomfield argued that this result was
unsound because the loss of priority
would discourage mortgagors and
mortgagees from cooperating to lease
vacant portions of distressed mort-
gaged premises once the IRS files a tax
lien notice. The district judge acknowl-
edged this but concluded:
[S]uch reasoning would also apply
to the accounts receivable at issue in
J.D. Court, and the Court declines to
assume the reasoning went over-
looked by that court. Instead, the
Seventh Circuit was persuaded by
the important role that tax collection
plays in our government. See J.D.
When the IRS claimed that




action in the U.S.
District Court for
Court, 712 E2d at 263 ("[t]he impor-
tance of securing adequate revenues
to discharge national obligations
justifies the extraordinary priority
accorded federal tax liens through
the choateness and first-in-time
doctrines").
Id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
reversed, remanding the case for entry
of a judgment declaring Bloomfield's
priority over the IRS for the collected
rents. In a brief yet characteristically
colorful opinion, Judge Richard Posner
argued that the IRS's "choateness"
argument was misguided and rejected
the notion that the rents were akin to
after-acquired accounts receivable. In
his view, the mortgaged land was in
existence before the tax lien filing, and
the rents were "proceeds" of the land
without regard to the timing of the
lease:
The real estate that generated the
rental income at issue in this case ex-
isted when the mortgage was issued
and thus before the tax lien attached;
the rental income was proceeds of
that property, which preexisted the
tax lien....
[B]ecause the bank had a lien on the
real estate, the rentals were pro-
ceeds. By virtue of the rental-income
provision in the mortgage [i.e., the
assignment of rents], the bank had a
separate lien on the rents, but that is
not the lien on which it is relying to
trump the tax lien. The lien on which
it is relying is the lien on the real
estate. If an asset that secures a loan
is sold and a receivable generated,
the receivable becomes the security,
substituting for the original asset.
The sort of receivable to which the
statute denies priority over a federal
tax lien is one that does not match
an existing asset; a month's rent is a
receivable that matches the value of
the real property for that month.
Bloomfield State Bank, 2011 WL 1773953,
at *3, *4.
So Is Judge Posner Correct?
In economic terms, the result in Bloom-
field State Bank is surely correct. As
Judge Posner points out, had the bor-
rower's land been sold at a foreclosure
sale, Bloomfield's prior-recorded mort-
gage would have given it clear priority
over the IRS for the sale proceeds. In
Posner's view, rents are economically
indistinguishable from sale proceeds
for priority purposes:
Whether the proceeds from the en-
forcement of a lender's lien take the
form of sale income or rental income
is a detail of no significance. To say
that a parcel of land is "sold" rather
than "rented" just means that the
owner sells the use of the land for-
ever rather than for a limited period.
Sale income and rental income are
just two forms of proceeds from land
(or from improvements on it).
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Bloomfield State Bank, 2011 WL 1773953,
at *3. This equivalence is well-es-
tablished in Article 9, which defines
"proceeds" to include "whatever is
acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition of col-
lateral." UCC § 9-102(a)(64)(A). As
an economic matter, the same should
be true under the law of real estate
finance. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of
Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism
in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications
for Reforming Commercial Real Estate
Finance, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1533
(1993) ("[a]n agreement to occupy
a commercial real estate project fits
squarely within the concept of 'pro-
ceeds' of the project").
In addition, Judge Posner appro-
priately distinguishes Bloomfield State
Bank from prior cases according the IRS
priority for accounts arising after the
tax lien filing. Even though rents are
technically "accounts" under Article 9,
a lien on rents is not strictly analogous
to a security interest in after-acquired
accounts receivable. All rents are
identifiable proceeds of the underlying
land, but not all accounts are identifi-
able proceeds of other collateral; some
are (for example, an account arising
out of the debtor's sale of inven-
tory collateral), and some are not (for
example, an account arising out of the
debtor's provision of personal ser-
vices). Only when an account does not
constitute proceeds of a secured party's
pre-existing collateral should the IRS
tax lien take priority over the secured
party. The appropriate analogy here is
to Bankruptcy Code § 552; although
Bankruptcy Code § 552(a) renders inef-
fective a secured party's after-acquired
property clause as of the petition date,
Bankruptcy Code § 552(b) makes clear
that a secured party's perfected secu-
rity interest in pre-petition collateral
also extends to rents and proceeds of
that collateral that are received by the
debtor post-petition. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
So ... What's the Problem?
In terms of the ultimate result in the
Bloomfield State Bank case, there is no
problem. As noted above, the mortgag-
ee's lien prevailed over the federal tax
lien, as it should have. Nevertheless, in
reaching this result, Judge Posner does
make a rather interesting "restatement"
of real estate finance law. In equating
rents and proceeds, Judge Posner states:
[The equivalence of rents and
proceeds] would have been obvious
in this case had not the mortgage
contained a provision stating that
the rental income generated by the
borrower's real estate was additional
collateral securing the mortgage.
That makes it seem as if the rental
income is a distinct form of prop-
erty rather than merely proceeds of
owning a rented property. Actually
the rental-income provision in the
mortgage is a superfluity.
Bloomfield State Bank, 2011 WL 1773953,
at *3. Taking this statement at its face,
it implies that a mortgage on land
automatically extends to rents-even
if there is no explicit assignment of
rents in the mortgage-in the same
sense that an Article 9 security inter-
est in personal property automatically
extends to proceeds of collateral. But,
although automatic proceeds coverage
is explicitly codified in Article 9, UCC
§§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2), modern real
estate finance law has not typically
recognized rents coverage as being
implicit in a mortgage.
Under the historical "title theory" of
mortgages, a mortgage was viewed as a
transfer of legal title (and the legal right
to possession) at the time of the mort-
gage's execution and delivery Under
this conception, of course, a mortgage
would implicitly cover rents, because
the right to lease the property and
collect rents would flow as a natural
incident of the mortgagee's legal title.
The vast majority of American jurisdic-
tions, however, has long since adopted
the "lien theory" of mortgages, under
which the mortgage merely creates a
lien on the land, with the mortgagor
retaining legal title unless that title is
extinguished in a foreclosure sale. Un-
der the lien theory, a mortgagee is not
entitled to collect rents merely by virtue
of its status as a mortgagee. Instead,
the mortgagee in a lien theory state can
only collect rents before foreclosure if
it becomes a mortgagee-in-possession,
obtains the appointment of a receiver,
or has taken and properly enforces an
assignment of rents. Grant S. Nelson &
Dale A. Whitman, 1 Real Estate Finance
Law § 4.20, at 270; § 4.23, at 279 (5th
Pract. ed. 2007). Against this back-
ground, it is wrong to characterize an
assignment of rents as a "superfluity."
I come to praise Judge Posner, not
to bury him. I agree with him-under
real estate finance law, a mortgage lien
should automatically extend to rents.
Article 9 has it right with its automatic
proceeds coverage, and real estate
finance law should embrace that ap-
proach. Where adopted, the Uniform
Assignment of Rents Act (UARA),
7 IA U.L.A. 1 (2006), would do so,
because UARA § 4(a) provides that a
mortgage automatically creates a lien
on rents arising from the mortgaged
property unless the mortgage provides
otherwise. UARA § 4 cmt. 1 ("the Act
adopts a default rule comparable to the
'proceeds' rules of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9"). It is hoped more states
will join Nevada, Utah, New Mexico,
and Texas in enacting the UARA or a
comparable statute. In the meantime,
however, mortgage lenders should keep
taking those assignments of rents. U
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